goods or information), but can also capture the emergent properties of resources. Specifically, DDG can describe both how the total value of a resource is changed when it is distributed among agents and how the value is changed synergistically when an agent owns different kinds of resources. Our preliminary study investigated the behavior of an evolutionary model with DDG on a one-dimensional torus and observed the emergence of altruism in certain scenarios. In this paper, we extend the study by investigating the effects of more realistic interaction networks on the emergence of altruism. Specifically, we focus on the behavior of DDG on small-world network topology.
The model Agents are on a network, which is generated using the Watts-Strogatz model. DGG is composed of a repetition of a resource distribution step and a strategy imitation step. In the distribution step, each agent distributes a unit of its unique kind of resource equally among its neighbors and itself. Each agent has its strategy represented by an integer value S: the number of nearest neighbors to whom it distributes resource (0 means the agent is selfish). The initial values are randomly set 0 or 1. If S is larger than the number of direct neighbors, recipients are selected from the neighbors of neighbors (and further if necessary).
In the imitation step, it will take over the strategy (S) of the neighbor who obtained the highest gain in the last distribution step. Mutation changes each S by 1 or -1 with a probability of 0.01 during imitation.
The gain of an agent (G i ), i.e. the resultant value of resource each agent owns at the end of a round is calculated using the following equations, with D and K being model parameters. D and K express the extent to which the overall value of one's resources is affected by the act of resource distribution.
Distributing property D (see Eq. 2) determines the type of resources being shared. D = 0 expresses that the resource is purely informational (each receiver obtains the entire copy), whereas D = 1 expresses the resource is purely physical (each receiver obtains an equally divided). Furthermore, considering that the resource value can be changed not only by distribution cost but also depending on the number of the people who will share the resource in general, we treat various types of resources in the unified fashion by assuming D is a real number.
Gathering property K allows us to model the synergistic effect of owing different goods by using the idea of entropy. For example, a certain set of knowledge combined together may lead to the creation of a new idea. For values of K larger than 0, the gain coming from received goods is increased beyond the value of its sum.
Results
We investigated the behavior of the system by varying the distributing property of resource D between 0 (information) and 1 (material goods) and the gathering property K being either 0 or 1, where K = 1 corresponds to a maximum synergistic effect of gathering different resources. The network has N = 65 as the population size, an initial node degree 4 and a rewiring probability p (p = 0 is the regular network and p = 1 is random network). Each game lasted 100000 generations and was replayed 100 times using a different random seed.
For K = 0 and resources close to material goods (D = 0.8, 1) only a very limited propensity to share emerged only with low values of p (p < 0.1, Fig. 1b) , in other words, with high spatial locality. For resources having a property closer to the information side (D = 0.6, 0.4, 0.2), the most altruistic agents emerged for intermediate values of p. Interestingly, we found that this range of p values corresponds to the networks having the highest small-world-ness coefficient (cf. Fig. 2a) , measured using the method of Humphries and Gurney (2008) .
In the scenario with synergistic resource effects (gathering property coefficient K = 1), the results for resources having a property closer to the information side were similar (Fig. 1c) . The agents, however, became on average even more altruistic. The situation was very different for resource closer to material goods. The truly altruistic agents now also emerged in networks having the highest small-world-ness coefficient (Fig. 1d ). We suspect that the small levels of altruism emerging in the scenario shown in Fig. 1b can be explained by the mechanism of spatial locality: on regulator networks, close cooperators survive by benefitting each other (cooperative clustering). In the small world networks, however, we think altruism emerges owing to the degree heterogeneity (Pacheco and Santos, 2005) . More precisely, the agent at the center of a hub has a high number of partners for interactions, therefore, it can get higher gain than the agent with the lower number of neighbors (assortative interactions). This causes agents around hubs to imitate altruistic strategy of the hub's central node, and potentially spreading the strategy further.
Conclusion
The correlation between small-world-ness and emergence of altruistic behavior observed in the DDG model, suggests that small-world networks may be essential for the emergence of altruism. Furthermore, we found that the gathering property of resource further strengthens the propensity of agents to behave in an altruistic way, which would otherwise not happen for resources that resemble material goods. We believe that DDG model sheds new light on the importance of social network structure for the emergence of cooperation as well as the powerful effect of synergistic resource effects. 
